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ON REGULATORY VARIABLES
REGULATORY VARIABLES AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.
JUDITH N. LEVI**
H.L.A. Hart's classic hypothetical posited a statute providing, "No
vehicles are allowed in the park."1 Hart then posed situations arising under
the statute: Would a police officer be compelled to arrest a mother who
brought a baby carriage into the park? The driver of an ambulance? Kids
on bicycles? The hypothetical applications are challenging, because they set
the apparent plain meaning of the statute against sensible results. Surely an
ambulance is a "vehicle," but just as surely it should sometimes be allowed
in the park, yes?
No issue discussed at the Conference on Law and Linguistics better
revealed the different intellectual approaches of the law professors and the
linguistic professors, than the Vehicles in the Park hypothetical. In the
course of our small group discussion, we came up with the concept of
regulatory variable as a means of bridging the intellectual gap between the
disciplines. In this Essay, we shall use the hypothetical as the means to
describe the intellectual puzzle that separates the two disciplines, specify
and develop our idea of words or phrases as "regulatory variables," and
suggest larger implications of our concept.
I. VEHICLES IN THE PARK: LAW VERSUS LINGUISTICS
Consider three hypothetical applications of the No vehicles in the park
law:
(i) A child rides her tricycle into the park.
(2) A health care team drives their ambulance into the park to rescue a
person who has just had a heart attack.
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. Davidson College (1973); M.A.
Harvard University (1974); J.D. Yale Law School (1978).
** Associate Professor of Linguistics, Northwestern University. B.A. Antioch College (1964);
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I. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law andMorals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).
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(3) A teenager rides his bicycle into the park along a bike path which a
statute subsequent to the No vehicles in the park law has designated
as a bike-riding route within the park.
Does the No vehicles in the park statute prohibit these variations? The two
groups of scholars approached these hypotheticals from different angles.
Although all were willing to say that none of the hypothetical perpetra-
tors should be arrested, the linguists and the lawyers differed sharply in
their accounts of just why no arrests should occur in those instances. The
linguists insisted that because the language of the statute remained constant,
the interpretation of that language must remain constant.2 Because the
language prohibited all vehicles, then tricycles, bicycles, and ambulances
were indeed prohibited (assuming that all three belong to the category
named by the noun vehicle)-by the plain language of the statute.
In contrast, most of the lawyers tended to believe that ambulances on
emergency missions, for example, would not be vehicles for the purpose of
the statute; they thought that the meaning of the statute changed as
circumstances changed. The idea that "the meaning of the statute" could
shift in this way from moment to moment was unacceptable to the
linguists, and the linguists' insistence on a more static concept of the plain
meaning of the statute was just as questionable to the lawyers. What was
the source of this intellectual divide?3
Not surprisingly, the linguists focused their attention on the domain
central to their training and interests, posing the inquiry as, "What is the
meaning of the statutory language?" Under conventional semantics, does
the category designated by the word vehicle include (1) tricycle[s], (2)
ambulance[s], or (3) bicycle[s]? The linguists at the conference viewed this
part of the inquiry as amenable to empirical research. The linguistic
researcher examines evidence for conventional meaning to determine
2. Much of the difficulty in this discussion and throughout the conference was that the two sets
of participants were trying to communicate by using the troublesome yet crucial words meaning and
interpretation before they had fully identified the different frameworks that gave each term different
significance to each profession. On this subject, see Michael L. Geis, The Meaning of "Meaning" In
Law, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1125 (1995); Peter M. Tiersma, The Ambiguity oflnterpretation: Distinguishing
Interpretation from Construction, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1095 (1995).
3. This phenomenon and the discussion that followed was generally replicated when the linguists
and lawyers discussed the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115
S. Ct. 464 (1994). For discussion of X-Citement Video, see Craig Hoffman, When World Views Collide:
Linguistic Theory Meets Legal Semantics in United States v. X-citement Video, Inc., 73 WASH. U. L.Q.
1217 (1995); and Jeffrey P. Kaplan & Georgia M. Green, Grammar and Inferences of Rationality in
Interpreting the Child Pornography Statute, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1225 (1995).
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whether an ordinary speaker of English would believe that the general
category "vehicle" includes within it the more specific items (1) tricycle,
(2) ambulance, and (3) bicycle.
The easiest case for the linguists was (2): the proposition that an
ambulance is a vehicle can be established by reference to several different
sources of evidence for conventional meaning.4 Cases (1) and (3) are not
so easy, as bikes and trikes are somewhat less typical of the category of
vehicles than ambulances. Still, the linguist's methodology would be the
same, that is, neutral and empirical investigation.
Equally unsurprising was that the lawyers saw the central inquiry as one
of the statute's application. While they also asked what the plain meaning
of the statute was, that issue was only one part of a more extended inquiry,
"How should this statute be applied?" Should a statute that says, "No
vehicles are allowed in the park," be applied to prohibit an ambulance from
driving into the park to rescue a heart attack victim? Even if the plain
meaning of the statute is that ambulances are included within its scope
because they are vehicles, the statute should not be applied to include the
ambulance under the circumstances described by the hypothetical. Thus, the
lawyers' approach overlapped with that of the linguists, but permitted the
circumstances of the hypothetical to take them beyond it.
Once it became clear that the answer to the hypothetical was being
sought along at least two different dimensions-that of language and that
of application--consensus seemed possible. The linguists were engaged
only in a descriptive or positive enterprise of ascertaining the conventional
meaning of the statute. They were perfectly willing to present to the
lawyers their findings as to the language facts, understanding that the latter
might choose to disregard the conventional meaning of the statutory
language because it violated a prescriptive or normative canon of legal
application. Some of the lawyers were equally happy to bifurcate the
enterprise: linguists would provide expert guidance on whether there is a
scientifically ascertainable plain meaning to the statute, but lawyers and
4. While one source of such evidence is informed introspection, linguists who study word
meaning find it essential to transcend the limits of introspection by first assembling a larger set of data
than introspection could provide. This can be done by computer-assisted searches of a large "language
corpus" to find many examples of how the word in question is used in naturally occurring language.
Their analysis can be extended further by questionnaire-surveys of speakers of the language. See Clark
D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561, 1588-1613 (1994)
(discussing meaning of enterprise for purposes of RICO). Nonetheless, informed introspection still plays
an essential role in interpreting the data garnered in a computer search and in generating effective
questions for a survey of native speakers.
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judges could invoke normative trumps to override plain meaning. Such
bifurcation is consonant with the methodology courts usually announce for
interpreting such statutes: the plain meaning controls, unless it is trumped
by the absurdity of its result, a constitutional concern, or clear legislative
intent to the contrary.
One of us (Eskridge) objected to this budding consensus. Can we
separate the descriptive from the prescriptive so cleanly? Where sentences
have legal consequences, as statutes do, should we consider meaning
without considering consequences?5 Are there not principles of linguis-
tics-most likely, within pragmatics-that might unsettle the ready belief
that vehicle means (1) tricycle, (2) ambulance, and (3) bicycle, at least
under the circumstances of the hypotheticals?
These questions stimulated a conversation that generated the concept of
regulatory variables.
II. REGULATORY VARIABLES, REGULATORY VARIABILITY
Our initial concept was that statutory terms like vehicles or no vehicles
are regulatory terms which, like other expressions in the language, have
conventional meaning that can be identified by empirical research.
However, while their linguistic meaning can thus be determined, their legal
meaning varies with the statute's purpose, other public policies, and the
degree of delegated discretion. Hence the term regulatory variables. There
are three components to this initial concept. First, statutory terms are
instrumental, serving regulatory purposes. Second, they are set in the
context of other regulatory purposes in the regime of legal rules and
principles. Third, embedded within the statutory enactment is an intent that
agents carrying out the statute have some discretion; the degree of
discretion is initially calibrated by the terms themselves but ultimately
subject to later developments.'
5. Addressing this issue is muddied again by use of the troublesome word meaning, whose
multiplicity if not duplicity of senses was emphasized by Michael Geis during the Saturday session. His
distinction between language meaning (or "L-meaning", as he put it) and significance in law (or "S-
meaning") is highly useful. See Geis, supra note 2.
6. Our discussion of regulatory variables centered on nouns like vehicles and noun phrases like
no vehicles, but other parts of speech can also be viewed as regulatory variables-especially when their
meanings are extremely general, as we note infra Part II. Examples include the adjectives reasonable
and deliberate in the phrases reasonable care and deliberate speed; and the verbs in phrases such as
possessing drugs, modifying a habitat, and agreeing to a contract. For that matter, prepositions like
near and at, and even the definite article the, are also subject to regulatory variability, as a glance at
their entries in the legal reference work, Words and Phrases, will reveal. See California Trout v.
[VOL. 73:1103
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When Levi coined the term regulatory variable in our small group
discussion, it was in an attempt to clarify the different approaches to
statutory language being taken by the linguists and the lawyers. Because the
linguists' understanding of the process of semantic change leads them to
reject the claim that the meaning of the statutory language changes every
time the statute is applied (or, more specifically, that the meaning of the
word vehicle changes every time an ambulance goes in or out of a park),
Levi proposed a shift in perspective for heuristic purposes. She suggested
that it might be useful to say instead that those applying the statute could
choose to treat a particular statutory term as if it were a "regulatory
variable," that is, as a term whose legal interpretation could vary as a
function of changing circumstances. The heuristic as if is critical to this
formulation.7
Legal interpreters are doing something different with statutory language
than what linguists would describe as "interpreting the meaning of the
language." Rather, or in addition, they are choosing to vary the applicabili-
ty of the statute for nonlinguistic reasons. This activity is very different
from what a linguist does to answer the question, "What is the conventional
meaning of the language in this statute?" In emphasizing that legal
interpreters can choose to vary the applicability of a statute (but cannot
choose to make the meaning of the language itself vary quite so easily), we
agree with Fred Schauer's conference observation that saying that a term
"is" a regulatory variable may misleadingly "suggest a necessity, whether
conceptual or empirical, rather than a choice by some identifiable human
actor." 8
For this reason, we have concluded that it is more felicitous to speak of
"regulatory variability" than to speak of "regulatory variables."9 And that
Schaefer, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15704, at *1 (9th Cir. June 26, 1995) (discussing the meaning of
"modifying" a habitat).
7. This is not critical for the other author (Eskridge). In his opinion, meaning itself (especially
in the sense of 'legal significance,' but also in its sense of 'conventional meaning') is highly variable,
especially over the long periods of time that statutes often last. Levi can hardly disagree with this
observation, but notes that the discussion inspiring the term regulatory variables did not involve
historical change in conventional meaning; it was change in meaning-as-legal-significance alone for
which the term was coined.
8. Law and Linguistics Conference, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 944 (1995) (statement by Fred Schauer).
See also id. at 846-47 (comments by Fred Schauer).
9. Although still heuristically useful, referring to specific words or phrases as regulatory variables
may give two other misleading impressions: one, that "regulatory variables" are entities that exist as
surely as the words and phrases of the statute do; and two, that we can tell (prospectively or
retrospectively) just which words and phrases of a statute "are" regulatory variables and which are not.
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"regulatory variability" is itself short for "the variability in applicability of
a statute, for regulatory purposes." We now develop this concept of
"regulatory variability" and illustrate it by reference to our No vehicles in
the park hypotheticals.
1. Applicability ofStatutory Language Varies with Regulatory Purpose.
Human communication is instrumental, or purposive. The goal of
communication might be to express our feelings or to delight the other
person. Frequently the goal is to influence the other person's conduct.
Statutes are special communications of the latter sort. They are commands
issued under the aegis of the state's force as a background incentive for
people to do as the statute says. The state usually does not issue commands
idly. Behind the command is a policy or principle or cluster of policies and
principles.'0
Hence we say that statutory language is regulatory: it seeks to regulate
human conduct in a way that serves public goals. When legal agents
interpret statutes, their inquiry into statutory meaning (in the broader sense
of 'legal significance') should be ascertained by reference to those purposes
and, preferably, should be understood consistent with them."
Linguists are no strangers to this idea. 2 The meaning (either intended
or inferred) of words or phrases used in ordinary conversation will often
depend upon the goal(s) of the interlocutor. As a result, how accurately we
interpret someone else's words will often depend on how accurately we
infer those goals. If I say, "Oh, go away," and it is apparent that I am
joshing with you, I am not using the words, Oh, go away, with their usual
conventional meaning that I want you to depart. Instead, I intend for you
to recognize the teasing quality of my utterance, as conveyed by intonation
and facial expression, and supported by mutual knowledge of our
relationship. In contrast, if you are a pesky sales agent bugging me at my
house and I petulantly say, "Oh, go away," I do mean for you to get the
10. See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1-181
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
11. This normative statement represents the view of Eskridge. Levi, as a linguist, recognizes that
authorial intention is always relevant to interpreting language, but takes no position on what weight
should be given to such inferred intentions vis-a-vis the many other possible considerations in legal
interpretation. She does note, however, that assigning heavier weight to authorial intentions than to
authorial language may have the regrettable effect of providing a disincentive to better and more
thoughtful drafting. Like the other linguists, she wonders why legislators should be held to a lower
standard of writing than that to which we professors hold our students.
12. See GEORGIA M. GREEN, PRAGMATICS AND NATURAL LANGUAGE UNDERSTANDING 13-15
(1989).
[VOL. 73:1103
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss3/19
REGULATORY VARIABLES
hell out, and my intonation will in this case reinforce rather than undo the
conventional meaning of the words themselves. The same sentence, then,
will be interpreted differently each time it is uttered (hence, the value of the
linguistic distinction between sentence and utterance), depending upon the
parameters of the specific context, including the speaker's purpose in
particular.
The question of whether a tricycle is a vehicle in the statutory sentence,
No vehicles are allowed in the park, cannot be answered independently of
the context of the inquiry. If you ask a linguist, who has determined that
tricycles are indeed members of the category denoted by the noun vehicle,
the answer will simply be "Yes"--because the linguist will be focusing on
the conventional meaning of the language alone. On the other hand, if you
ask a lawyer or an official charged with enforcing the statute or even a
citizen charged with obeying it, the response will certainly be more
complicated. These latter interpreters will consider not only the convention-
al language meaning, but also such questions as, "What is the purpose of
the statute?" If the law was a response to injuries to pedestrians from
motorcycles racing through the park, it makes less sense to treat the statute
as excluding tricycles from the park, even though in other conversational
contexts people may speak of a tricycle as a vehicle. 3
The analysis is different if the No vehicles in the park law was animated
by a different safety concern, namely, the safety of people riding in or on
vehicles. If the law was a response to injuries to bicycle riders running into
one another, it makes somewhat more sense to read the statute as excluding
tricycles from the park. 4
2. Applicability of Statutory Language Varies with Other Policies and
Purposes. Assume that the purpose of the No vehicles in the park statute
is the protection of pedestrians from physical injury, and assume that this
purpose will guide the legal application of the statute. Under these
assumptions, Hypothetical (1) (tricycles) would probably not be embraced
13. We put the matter differently in earlier exchanges. The lawyer (Eskridge) tends to view the
inquiry as, "Does vehicle include tricycles in the policy context of this statute?" The meaning of the
statutory term vehicle itself is variable. The linguist (Levi) tends to describe the inquiry in different
words, such as, "Even though the category denoted by the word vehicle may include tricycles in
ordinary language use, in the context of the purpose behind this statute, it may not make legal sense
to treat the statute as excluding tricycles from the park." This is another instance where our different
uses of the words meaning and interpretation influence our discussions of language, even when those
two words themselves do not appear.
14. We ignore for present purposes the complicating possibility that tricycle riders are typically
better supervised than bicycle riders.
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within the statutory purpose, Hypothetical (2) (ambulance) would seem
clearly embraced, and Hypothetical (3) (bicycles) would also probably be
included. These conclusions are too hasty, however.
The meaning of human communication depends not just on the purpose
of the particular utterance, but also on other purposes and precepts assumed
by or accompanying the utterance. Suppose that I am angry with a public
figure and tell you, "Let's get rid of him!" My exhortation does not mean
that I think that you should attack or kidnap the person, even though this
would be one possible way to interpret the meaning of the statement in a
way that is consistent with my general purpose. Instead, your interpretation
of the meaning of my utterance must be informed by more general
assumptions that you and I share, including the presumption that I do not
intend for either of us to break the law or do another person physical harm.
Likewise, a decision concerning how to apply or interpret regulatory
terms such as vehicle or no vehicles will vary not only with statutory
purpose, but also with other goals and policies of the overall regulatory
regime. The term no vehicles can be taken to mean "no ambulances" under
normal circumstances, but not in an emergency, when driving the
ambulance through the park is necessary to save someone's life. Notwith-
standing the danger posed by the ambulance to pedestrians in the park
(whose protection is the purpose of the statute), a reasonable person with
interpretive authority could maintain that the statute's meaning allows the
ambulance in such emergency.
Hypothetical (3) is slightly different, because a second, later-enacted
statute has created a bicycle path in the park. It is still true that bicycles
can plausibly be included within the category of vehicle and within the
statutory purpose, and it is apparent that there is no "exigent circumstance"
that would justify an exception for bicycles such as the one created for an
ambulance saving someone's life. Nonetheless, the interpretation of the
language of the original statute in the context of the city's entire regulatory
regime must now reflect the newer law which designates a part of the park
as a bike path. The two laws might at first blush appear to have inconsis-
tent meanings: one prohibits bicycles from the park, while the other makes
a legitimate place for them (both physically and legally). The laws can be
reconciled, however, by narrowing the earlier, more general one in light of
the later, more targeted one.
3. Applicability of Statutory Language Varies with Delegated
Discretion. The applicability of the statutory term vehicle or no vehicles
proves to be highly variable, not only because it is embedded in a
regulatory regime, but for other reasons as well. Unlike most other
[VOL. 73:1103
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communicative utterances, statutes are addressed to a large and heteroge-
neous audience. That audience includes administrators, who are typically
the initial audience for the statute, but the audience also includes the
citizenry. Because statutes are directive in nature and infinite in duration
(usually), their intended audience also includes future administrators and
citizens. The heterogeneity of the intended audience, the indefinite duration
of the communication's effects, and the key role played by administrators
(other state officials) suggest the importance of discretion-an administra-
tive law term for regulatory variability-in the statute's implementation
over time.
The legislature has several mechanisms for calibrating the amount of
discretion officials have, and the primary mechanism is the language of the
statute. Human communication occurs at different levels of generality, and
statutes are drafted with different degrees of interpretive discretion in mind.
The generality of No vehicles are allowed in the park vests much greater
interpretive discretion with agents than a more targeted statute like No
automotive vehicles are allowed in the park or No vehicles are allowed in
the park, and here is what "vehicles" means for purposes of this statute:
* * *. The level of linguistic generality permits an inference about the
speaker's willingness to delegate gap-filling discretion to another person
(i.e., police officers and judges). The more general the statutory term, the
more discretion the directive is implicitly vesting in the implementing
official."
If the speaker were more confident or dogmatic--or even thought-
ful-about how her command should be applied, she might be inclined to
write a statute that is better specified. For example, the legislature might
have used a more specific term, such as automotive vehicle rather than
vehicle. Or the legislature might have included a provision defining more
precisely what is meant by vehicle, or excluding items from the definition,
or both. Or the statute could have been more open-textured, providing that,
No unauthorized dangerous things are allowed in the park. That would be
an intelligible command, but one vesting enormous discretion in the official
delegated the power to say what is "unauthorized" and what is "dangerous."
The choice of a relatively open-textured regulatory term such as vehicle
thus increases the odds that a legal interpreter will be obliged to treat it as
a "regulatory variable," because the language's generality does not
meaningfully constrain its interpretation to a determinate set of category
I5. Whether this discretion is vested deliberately or inadvertently is another question.
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members.
M. IMPLICATIONS OF OUR CONCEPT
The concept of regulatory variability can help bridge the two disciplines
of law and linguistics by exploiting a fuzzy edge that the disciplines share.
Both disciplines seek regularized patterns in human communication and
prize predictability. Yet both disciplines also recognize that meaning
depends on context, although both hope that context is not infinitely elastic.
Hence, our use of words and phrases is variable, in both legal and ordinary
contexts. This is the "fuzzy edge" shared by our two disciplines.
Statutes are a form of communication that seeks to affect human conduct.
Hence, the variability of statutory terms is regulatory. This regulatory
variability is an important reason that the implementation of statutes
evolves over time, but statutory evolution is neither unbounded nor
completely unpredictable. Linguists and lawyers can cooperate in exploring
the bounded predictability of statutory application.' 6
Even though the application of statutory terms is variable, their
conventional meaning in ordinary conversation remains pertinent informa-
tion. Almost all the major theorists of statutory interpretation, and all who
are sitting judges, believe that the starting point for application is statutory
text. An increasing number of theorists, the so-called "new textualists,"' 7
believe that text should also be the stopping point in most cases. By
providing a more rigorous methodology for ascertaining conventional plain
meaning, linguists can contribute greatly to the new textualist enterprise. 8
We think an equally useful contribution of linguistics is to provide
theoretical bases for criticizing interpretive methodologies that deny the
dynamicism of purposeful human communication and insist that statutory
meaning and application are static over time. Our concept of regulatory
variability supports a more subtle view of statutory interpretation as
dynamic over time.
For Eskridge, the legislature's purpose or goal is central to the concept
of regulatory variability. This suggests, strongly, that the expectations of
the legislature are highly relevant to statutory meaning, especially in the
16. For an exemplar of such cooperation, in Eskridge's opinion, see Cunningham et al., supra note
4.
17. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990).
18. This observation should not be taken as an endorsement by any linguist or linguists of this
enterprise. As noted earlier, linguists take no normative position qua linguists on deciding which factors
should control, or dominate, the process of legal interpretation-not even language.
[VOL. 73:1103
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period right after the statute's enactment. In the large majority of cases,
conventional plain meaning will be congruent with legislative expectations.
Hence, evidence of the latter (legislative history) will usually be confirma-
tory rather than contradictory. 9
When it is the latter, we agree that lawyers and linguists can cooperate
in reconciling the evidence. Is there a semantic ambiguity that drafters
missed the first time? Was the legislature operating under assumptions that
have changed, or that were never the case? The concept of regulatory
variability is fully consonant with the idea that statutory purpose, gleaned
from legislative history, is an important consideration.
A final constraint on regulatory variability is practice. The methods by
which linguists ascertain conventional usage of terms and phrases in
ordinary conversation can of course be applied to the specialized conversa-
tions of law. If the legislature chooses a regulatory term that has a rich
common law or regulatory history, that history is useful context for
applying the term. If the legislature chooses a regulatory term that is then
applied by administrators, judges, and citizens in a certain way, that
subsequent practice is relevant to the term's evolving legal meaning.
Lawyers already research practical usage along these lines, but rarely in the
systematic way that linguists research conventional usage.
CONCLUSION
We began our inquiry into regulatory variability by coining the term
regulatory variables. We then shifted our emphasis to the related notion of
regulatory variability in order to emphasize the more dynamic, more fluid
quality of the process whereby authorized legal agents make contingent,
contextualized decisions about whether and where to apply the statute in
which such terms are embedded.
Both concepts suggest several new lines of inquiry in connection with
statutory interpretation. For example, when the legislature uses a highly
variable term, such as reasonable or all deliberate speed, it might be
deemed to say, "Here's a regulatory variable leaving open many options for
future application. We can't, or don't want to, constrain officials applying
this term of the statute." This in turn suggests how important is the
allocation of institutional authority to apply statutes. Which officials should
have the authority to fill in the details of regulatory variables? What
19. See United States v. Granderson, 114 S. Ct. 1259 (1994) (essentially adopting the analysis in
Cunningham et al., supra note 4, at 1577-82).
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hierarchy of authority should they have? Under what circumstances should
they be able to change their interpretation and adopt a new application of
a particular regulatory variable?
Our twin concepts of regulatory variables and regulatory variability also
permit us to ask new questions of linguistic interest. Although these terms
were introduced to clarify the specifically legal process of statutory
interpretation, a broader issue that needs to be addressed is whether
"regulatory variability" is a phenomenon peculiar only to the legal context,
or whether it represents a far more general phenomenon characteristic of
all natural language understanding. During the conference, Michael Moore
presented "ten possible ingredients to the theory of interpretation," dividing
them into four which were based on his theory of communication (and thus
presumably amenable to empirical research by linguists) and six that he
characterized as "peculiar to law" (and thus presumably off limits, so to
speak, to linguistic expertise), such as imaginative reconstruction, prior
judicial interpretations, and various "tie-breaker" rules.2° However, Levi
later demonstrated that each of the latter six components has a counterpart
within the kinds of pragmatic reasoning that ordinary people apply every
day to interpret ordinary language, both spoken and written, in ordinary
contexts.
2
'
Thus, an intriguing direction for future research would be to explore in
more detail whether any of the features of legal interpretation (including
not only statutory interpretation but other domains as well, such as
interpretation of constitutional and contractual language) is unique to the
legal process, or whether a counterpart in our everyday pragmatic abilities
can be found for each of these features. This question should be of great
interest to legal scholars because a positive answer could point the way
towards a greater integration of discoveries in pragmatics into our
understanding of the nature of legal interpretation. The question should
be no less interesting to linguistic scholars, who will indeed be curious to
see how well a set of pragmatic principles of communication originally
20. Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 8, at 886-88 (statement by Michael Moore).
21. Id. at 896-97 (statement by Judith Levi). See also, Jerry Sadock's suggestion, that the process
of legal interpretation which encompasses regulatory variability is "really just a special case" of the
pragmatic competence shared and practiced by all language users "[to impute significance to an
utterance that is different from the significance that derives solely in virtue of the words." Id. at C35.
22. For two relevant articles that have begun the comparative research effort, see Geoffrey P.
Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1179; and M. B. W. Sinclair,
Law and Language: The Role of Pragmatics in Statutory Interpretation, 46 U. Pin. L. REV. 373
(1985).
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studied in far less technical contexts fit the specialized discourse and
specialized settings of legal interpretation.'
We have developed the idea of regulatory variability to assist us in
articulating the distinction between the process of determining the
conventional meaning of statutory language, and the process of applying
that language in particular circumstances. Understanding this distinction, in
turn, permits us to identify where linguists can play a role in statutory
interpretation. Their insights and empirical methodology are especially
useful, and perhaps critical, to legal inquiries into a statute's plain meaning
but are not determinative for legal assessment whether to apply a statute
according to its plain meaning. Moreover, linguistic analysis can help
lawyers distinguish more sharply between interpretive judgments derived
from rigorous observations of conventional meaning, and those derived
from normative regulatory concerns. We believe this contribution would
make for better law, because it would render officials' normative and
regulatory choices more transparent to the legislature that enacts the
operative statutory language and to the citizens who must obey it.
23. See Georgia M. Green, The Universality of Gricean Interpretation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SIXTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BERKELEY LINGUISTICS SOCIETY 411-428 (1990) (arguing that
Gnce's Cooperative Principle should be broadly applicable to the interpretation of language, well
beyond the genre of "conversation").
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